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Rome as the last universal empire in
the ideological discourse of the 2nd
 century BCE
Federico Russo
 
Rome as a universal empire in Polybius’
historiography
1 According  to  Polybius’  account  (15.10.2),  P. Cornelius  Scipio  Africanus  delivered a
speech to the Roman army before the Battle of Zama (202 BCE):
Bear  in  mind,  he  said,  your  past  battles  and  fight  like  brave  men  worthy  of
yourselves and your country. Keep it before your eyes that if you overcome your
enemies not only will you be unquestioned masters of Africa, but you will gain for
yourselves and your country the undisputed command and sovereignty of the rest
of the world.1
2 Modern  historians  have  generally regarded  these  words  with  some  scepticism  and
interpreted  them  as  nothing  more  than  a  series  of  propagandistic  clichés.  Such  a
conception, it is argued, belongs to Polybius’ personal and a posteriori interpretation of
the historical  facts  of  that  period;  no contemporary source would have framed the
Battle of Zama in such terms.2 However, F.W. Walbank is of a different opinion. In his
study of the role of direct and indirect speech in Polybius’ writings, Walbank correctly
argues that Scipio’s speech before Zama
represents  what  Scipio  actually  said,  despite  the  fact  that  on  such  occasions
commonplaces are what one can reasonably expect. But this does not mean that
Polybius improvised. In view of the principles which he enunciates so consistently
and with such vigour, it seems to me more likely that he took his account of Scipio’s
speech in good faith from whatever source he used for the battle of Zama.3
3 Walbank thus claims that Polybius did not invent the speech; he was simply recording
what he found in his sources, which could have been directly influenced by themes and
issues that characterized the ideological discourse of Rome during its oversea wars. The
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aim of  this  paper  is  to  substantiate  Walbank’s  view,  adducing evidence from other
contemporary sources.
4 In P. Scipio Africanus’ speech the nexus between the outcome of the battle of Zama and
the consequent  universal  dimension of  Roman power is  especially  noteworthy.  The
same conception is mentioned by Polybius in his introduction to his account of the
Battle of Zama (15.9.4-5):
Neither would it  be easy to find a case in which destiny had offered such great
rewards to the adversaries as those which there were then. The victors in the battle
would have exercised dominion not only over Libya or Europe but also over the
other regions of  the inhabited world which we know about today.  Exactly what
came about not long after.4
5 From Polybius’ perspective, the significance of the battle is not that it led to Roman
dominion over Libya.  Rather it  is  important because it  represents the beginning of
Rome’s dominion over Europe and, more importantly, the entire known world. From a
historical point of view, it is clear that such an association is a piece of hyperbolic and
propagandistic discourse hailing from the period of the Second Punic War. However,
themes  such  as  the  idea  of  Europe  as  Rome’s  realm  of  dominion  (in  ideological
opposition to Carthage and Libya) and the image of Rome’s universal empire are not
limited to isolated and scattered references to the Battle of Zama. Such conceptions
played a major role in the context of the Syrian War as well and were, more generally,
part of the ideology Rome developed to justify its territorial expansion in Greece and
Asia Minor.5
6 Especially interesting in Polybius’ account is the projection of the battle’s outcome and
consequence onto the future, as if to say that Zama would be only the beginning of
Rome’s  progression  towards  universal  world  domination.  The  fact  that  Polybius
specifies that Rome will acquire this dominion shortly after Zama could be understood
as  a  reference  to  the  Syrian  War,  when  Roman  power  took  on  an  ideological-
universalistic character for the first time (for this theme, see below). Polybius’ source,
using hindsight to reconsider the events of Zama, may have identified the battle – and
above all  its  positive  outcome for  Rome –  as  the first  step on its  way to  universal
dominion!
7 It is necessary to clarify when Zama began to be perceived by Romans as an important
historical event. In other words, when did this battle come to be seen as an epochal
turning point on Rome’s path to a universal dominion? It is certainly significant that
Polybius links P. Scipio Africanus to the theme of universal dominion: it is P. Scipio
Africanus who reminds his soldiers that Rome will obtain undisputed dominion over
the whole inhabited world. If we consider the crucial propagandistic role played by P.
Cornelius  Scipio  Africanus  at  the  beginning  of  the  2nd century  –  in  an  anti-Roman
tradition, probably dating to the same period, he prophesizes disaster and catastrophe
for Rome6 – his prophecy here about Rome’s future, universal dominion is certainly
interesting.7
8 The theme of universal dominion appears in another tradition which has been for the
most part ignored by modern scholars (with the important exception of Passerini8). In
an  analysis  of  the  literary  sources  related  to  Hannibal’s  presence  at  the  court  of
Antiochus III  and to his  plans to bring the war to Italian soil,  Passerini  refers to a
passage from Cornelius Nepos’ Life of Hannibal (8.3: "On the other hand, Antiochus, if he
had been as willing to follow Hannibal’s advice in the conduct of the war as he had been
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determined in his enthusiasm for it, then he would have contended for the empire of
the world (summa imperii) nearer to the Tiber than Thermopylae"9). Passerini explains:
"assai frettoloso e retoricamente elaborato per produrre effetto […] Utilizzabile è solo
quelle che egli accenna dell’oggetto della guerra (de summa imperii), che dimostra una
concezione uguale a quella di Giustino". It is precisely the affinity of this particular
aspect of Nepos’ account to other sources which describe Hannibal’s plans to invade
Italy that leads Passerini to include at least a part of Nepos’  biography of Hannibal
among the reliable – or at least plausible – historical sources of the period. If we accept
Passerini’s  interpretation,  the  importance  of  Cornelius  Nepos’  passage  is  clear:  it
mentions the theme of summa imperii – that is the greatest dominion ever, a dominion
of ecumenical dimensions – in relation to another important episode of the beginning
to the 2nd century BCE, the Syrian War. One element of Cornelius Nepos’ passage allows
us to contextualize these words attributed to Hannibal in the ideological climate which
prevailed during the outbreak of the Syrian War: in order to emphasise that the main
aspect of Hannibal’s strategy was to bring the war first to Italy and specifically to Rome
itself,10 Cornelius  Nepos  draws  an  interesting  parallel  between  the  Tiber  river  and
Thermopylae.  Certainly,  the reference to Thermopylae could have been added later
based  on  a  retrospective  reflection  on  the  actual  developments  of  the  Syrian  war,
which also involved a battle at Thermopylae. However, it is clear that such a reference
must also have had other and more ideologically  evocative meanings.  Thermopylae
must be seen as pertaining to a wider, Persian theme, constituting a symbol of the clash
between  the  Greeks  and  Persians  or  between  Greeks  and  Barbarians,  the  conflict
between West and East,  Europe and Asia.11 In light of the role that the anti-Persian
theme played in the Roman anti-Seleucid propaganda at the time of the Syrian War,12 it
is possible that the reference to Thermopylae constitutes, in Cornelius Nepos’ source
(which  the  biographer  may  have  summarized),  an  echo  of  the  ideological  climate
current during the clash between Rome and Antiochus, lending credence to the fact
that summa imperii was the war’s primary objective (at least in propaganda).
9 The ideological basis of Cornelius Nepos’ account must also be understood in relation to
the ideological rivalry between P. Scipio Africanus and Hannibal.13 It  is certainly no
accident that it is in Nepos’ biography of Hannibal, specifically during his description of
Hannibal’s designs on Rome and Italy, that Antiochus is characterized as aspiring for
universal  dominion  himself  at  the  exact  moment  in  which  C.  Scipio  Africanus  was
elected consul.14
10 Plutarch seems to confirm that universal dominion was one of Antiochus’ objectives. He
writes:  "πρὸς  τὴν  ἁπάντων  ἡγεμονίαν  ἀποβλέποντα,  μάλιστα  δὲ  κατὰ  Ῥωμαίων
ἀνιστάμενον"  (Plutarch,  Titus  Flamininus  9.6).  It  is  particularly  noteworthy that  this
comment is linked to Hannibal’s presence at the king’s court and to his attempts to
persuade the Seleucid king to attack Rome, which is remarkably similar to the passage
from Nepos. It would obviously be simplistic to view this brief comment from Plutarch
as historical evidence of the Seleucid plans. However, we cannot help but emphasise
that, once again, the theme of universal dominion arises in reference to the struggle
between Antiochus and Rome. This further confirms that the theme was an important
element in the propaganda strategy employed in the political climate of that period.
11 Other pieces of evidence confirm this interpretation. For instance, Plutarch (De Pythiae
oraculis  399c)  records  the  words  of  an  oracle  which  links  a  series  of  devastating
earthquakes (which occurred shortly after the battle of Cynoscephalae) to the prophecy
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of Roman victory over the Macedonians. This episode is also mentioned by Justin, who,
however, interprets it in a very different way (30.4.4): "Everyone was astonished by this
wonder and the seers foresaw that the embryonic Roman empire would devour those of
the  Greeks  and the  Macedonians".15 According  to  Ferrary,  Justin  is  referencing the
theme of translatio imperii, the transfer of universal dominion from the Macedonians to
the  Romans.16 Ferrary  also  argues  that  this  reference  to  translatio  imperii is
anachronistic in the context of Cynoscephalae and should probably be attributed to the
ideological  context  of  Pompeius  Trogus’  time.17 However,  we  can  counter  this
interpretation  by  citing  another  text  of  another  oracle  related  to  the  defeat  of
Macedonia at the hands of men "from the West and the East", reported by Pausanias.18
This expression contains references to the Romans (as "men from the West") and to the
inhabitants of Pergamum ("men from the East") who would together have defeated the
Macedonians. However, according to Ferrary, Pausanias’ explanation is not altogether
satisfactory as it would have been more logical to portray the Aetolians as being on
Rome’s side (as in fact occurred, as reported in Alcaeus of Messene’s epigram). For this
reason, Ferrary believes that this oracle was codified in Pergamum after 180 BCE, when
both Eumenes, king of Pergamum, and Philip V sought to obtain control over the cities
of coastal Thrace. During this time, Pergamum, Rome’s ally, codified an oracle against
Philip V, which already celebrated its victory (and that of the Romans) over Philip at
the time of Cynoscephalae. This would explain, Ferrary argues, the oracle’s reference to
the "men from the West and the East" as well as Pausanias’ comment.19 The reference
to East  and West  not  as  opposites  (as  occurs  in anti-Roman traditions,  such as  the
prophecy reported by Antisthenes of  Rhodes and mentioned above)  but as  allies  in
productive partnership is reminiscent of the Roman propaganda against Philip V and
Antiochus III.  The  East-West  dialectic  was  part  of  the  ideological  panorama  of  this
specific  historical  climate.20 Moreover,  the  ideologically  important  bond  between
Europe  (or  the  West  according  to  the  contraposition  mentioned  above)  and  Rome
acquired importance in the context of Roman expansion. Finally, the Trojan myth –
which, in the interpretation given to it at the time of the Syrian War, portrayed the
arrival  of  the  Romans  in  Ilion  as  a  rightful  and  legitimate  return  to  an  ancestral
homeland – gave the Romans themselves the credit for reconciling East and West. Such
a meeting was another way of presenting the idea of universal dominion which had also
been  realized  by  the  empire  of  Alexander  the  Great.21 For  this  reason,  it  is  more
plausible to see the obscure expressions of the oracle reported by Pausanias not as a
reference  to  the  Pergamians,  which  would  certainly  have  been  anachronistic,  but
rather  as  a  celebrative  reference  to  the  Romans,  implying  not  only  their  Trojan
ancestry but also the universal character (from West to East) of their dominion.
 
Rome as the last universal empire
12 In this respect, the evidence provided by Aemilius Sura should be also considered as it
mentions  Rome  as  the  last  universal  empire  within  the  so-called  translatio  imperii
(Velleius Paterculus, Compendium of Roman History, 1.6.6):
The Assyrians were the first of all nations to hold world power, then the Medes, and
after  them the  Persians,  and  then the  Macedonians.  Subsequently,  through the
defeat of Kings Philip and Antiochus, of Macedonian origin, following closely upon
the overthrow of Carthage, the world power passed to the Romans. Between this
time and the beginning of the reign of Ninus king of the Assyrians, who was the
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first  to  hold  world  power,  lies  an interval  of  nineteen hundred and ninety-five
years.22
13 In  analysing  this  passage,  scholars  have  paid  particular  attention  to  chronological
problems. While some historians date Aemilius Sura to the first half of the 2nd century
BCE,  others  argue  against  this  hypothesis.  In  general,23 alongside  various  specific
objections, it has been argued that the very idea of "universal empire" cannot have
been part of the Roman worldview during the first half of the 2nd century BCE and that
Aemilius Sura – and therefore the concept of Rome’s universal empire – must be dated
much later, to the first half of the 1st century BCE, or even to the early imperial period,
when the idea of Rome as a universal empire would have made more sense and would
have been in line with Augustus’ ideology.24
14 In my opinion, it is important to distinguish between the dating of Aemilius Sura, who
may have been a Late Republican author, and the image of Rome as a universal empire:
indeed, nothing precludes the possibility that this image was already circulating in the
first half of the 2nd century BCE and then was reformulated during the 1st century BCE
to respond to new ideological needs.
15 By contrast, it seems implausible that the idea that Rome gained her summa imperii as a
consequence  of  the  Syrian  War  was  codified,  for  the  first  time,  at  the  end  of  the
Republic  (or  even  later).  In  that  period,  it  would  have  been  odd  to  refer  to  the
territories Rome acquired by defeating Antiochus as its greatest territorial expansion.
It goes without saying that from a late-Republican or early imperial perspective a more
recent reference would have been more appropriate. Rome’s empire grew extensively
after the end of the Syrian War and it is, thus, extremely difficult to understand why a
late-Republican  or  early  imperial  tradition  would  have  projected  the  maximum
expansion of Rome’s Empire so far back into the past, ignoring subsequent conquests.
Furthermore, Mendels’ observations do not refute this as he argues that the association
between the end of the Syrian War and the idea of maximum expansion was purely
illustrative in function.
16 It is much more likely that this perspective belongs to a historical period in which the
victory over the Seleucids constituted, in Roman eyes, the achievement of the summa
imperii. On the other hand, as we have seen, this was not the first time that such an
important victory involved contemporary or subsequent references to summa imperii in
Roman propaganda. In the light of these considerations, it is plausible that the concept
of universal dominion, articulated in the image of the succession of empires, could have
reflected  the  propagandistic  discourse  which  acted  as  the  backdrop  to  the  Second
Macedonian and Syrian Wars.25
17 Thus, we can partially agree with Mendels when he states: "I would like to suggest that
the stimulus to turn the theory into a propagandistic topos could have arisen when
Rome started to interfere intensively in the regions which belonged to the first three
empires of the topos, namely in the first century BC".26 We cannot, however, agree with
his  claim  that  Rome  began  to  intervene  actively  in  Asia  (the  region  in  which  the
succession of empires first began) only in the 1st century BCE; Roman intervention in
Asia had already begun in the 2nd century BCE with the Syrian War, especially during
the  events  which  preceded  and  caused  it.  The  very  Persian  characterisation  of
Antiochus III and the struggle between the king and Rome (which as a propagandistic
strategy only reappears episodically on later occasions),27 undoubtedly contributed to
the decision to use the framework of the succession of universal empires, since the
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Persians were themselves one of these empires. In the same way, the use of the Asia-
Europe dialectic could have facilitated recourse to the concept of universal dominion
as, for example, can be inferred from Livy (36.17.14). There Livy describes M. Acilius
Glabrio,  prior  to  the  battle  of  Thermopylae,  forecasting  the  defeat  of  Asia  and the
extension of Roman dominion ad ortum ditissima regna in complete accordance with the
universal perception of the final victory over Antiochus III (Livy, 38.8.4): "Antiochus
had been defeated both on land and sea and driven beyond the Taurus almost to the
ends of the world".28
18 Another piece of evidence confirms that the idea of universal dominion (in connection
or in opposition to Rome) circulated during Rome’s oversea wars.  Summarizing the
Syrian  War,  Florus  states  (1.24.2):  "Report  never  represented  any  war  as  more
formidable than this, as the Romans thought of the Persians and the East, of Xerxes and
Darius, of the days when impassable mountains were said to have been cut through and
the sea hidden with sails".29 Later, in paragraph 11, Florus adds: "They pursued him in
his flight, and at Thermopylae, a place memorable for the glorious defeat of the three
hundred Spartans […] and forced him to own them victors by land and sea".30 And
finally,  and  no  less  significantly:  "Let  not  Athens  be  over-proud:  in  Antiochus  we
defeated a Xerxes; in Aemilius we had the equal of an Alcibiades; at Ephesus we rivalled
Salamis".31 In Florus’ description of the Syrian War, the idea of the inevitability of the
Roman Empire, moving from West to East, also prefigures and implies the birth of a
new universal dominion.
19 This  piece  of  evidence  has  never  received  the  attention  it  deserves  from  modern
scholars, who have simply counted it as another case of references to Greek history
being used to glorify Roman victories. However, as argued elsewhere,32 given that the
comparison between L. Aemilius Regillus and Alcibiades seems to precisely correspond
to the propagandistic needs of the Aemilii – and may have originally been formulated
specifically for this purpose – it  is  possible that the parallel  between the battles of
Salamis and Ephesus played a similar ideological function. In Livy’s parallel narration
of the battle of Ephesus, there is no trace of parallelism with any of the events of the
Greco-Persian Wars (37.27-30). It is, therefore, significant that the synthetic character
of Florus’ work does not prevent the author from indulging in details which are not
essential  to  his  narrative  but  rather  designed  to  give  an  understanding  of  the
ideological climate in which this simile was produced. Livy, in contrast to the tradition
reported in Florus, does not draw any parallels between the Persian and Syrian Wars.33
Given Livy’s limited interest in the Persian Wars, we would suggest that Florus took his
account  of  the  Syrian  War  from  elsewhere,  confirmed  by  the  other  discrepancies
between the two accounts.34
20 It has been suggested that Aemilius Sura could have been one of the sources Florus
employed – directly or indirectly – for his narration of the Syrian War, mostly because
Florus seems to present the war in a light favourable to the Aemilii.35
21 Indeed, while Florus’ version has several discrepancies in respect to the parallel version
of Livy, it is reminiscent of the inscription that L. Aemilius Regillus placed in the temple
of the Lares Permarini in 190 BCE on occasion of his victory on Antiochus III. The text of
the inscription is reported by Livy36 (Livy, 40.52.5):
When Lucius the son of Marcus Aemilius went out to battle to put an end to a great
war  and to  subdue kings  […]  The  chief cause  of  obtaining  peace  […]  under  his
auspicious command and fortunate leadership the fleet of Antiochus, ever before
invincible, was defeated, shattered and put to flight between Ephesus, Samos and
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Chios, before the very eyes of Antiochus and of his whole army, his cavalry and
elephants. On that day forty-two ships of war were captured there, with all their
crews;  and after that battle had been fought,  King Antiochus and his  realm […]
Wherefore, because of this action he vowed a temple to the Lares Permarini.37
22 Apart from the differences between the inscription and the rest of the tradition,38 the
description  of  Antiochus  watching  the  destruction  of  his  fleet  echoes  an  image
portrayed  by  Herodotus  (8.90)  in  which  Xerxes  watches  from  the  slopes  of  Mount
Aigaleo as his fleet was wiped out.39 As Livy omits this detail (Livy, 36.43.9), it seems
that for Florus (or his source) the need to echo the Salamis episode had significant
repercussions for way the event was narrated and resulted in certain alterations in
sequence. Accordingly, the similarity with Herodotus’ version of the battle of Salamis is
meant to emphasize not only the importance of L. Aemilius Regillus, whose military
skill serves as a foil to the limited abilities of Antiochus, but also, more generally, the
battle itself, which one tradition sought to link to the illustrious example of the Greeks
at  Salamis.  Zevi  rightly  notes  the  connection  between  the  temple  inscription  and
Florus’  passage:  they both seem to belong to  a  contemporary account of  the event
which was only partially incorporated into Livy’s own account. This would mean that
the  "Persian"  characterisation  of  Florus’  chapter  on  the  Syrian  War  should  not  be
attributed to the author’s own literary presentation, but rather to a chronologically
close (if not contemporary) tradition narrating the war between Antiochus and Rome.40
In  the  light  of  these  considerations,  we  could  hypothesize  that  the  rest  of  Florus’
narration  of  the  Syrian  War  –  including  the  important  references  to  the  translatio
imperii and to the summa imperii of Rome – must also be attributed to a source which
was very close to the events it describes, possibly Aemilius Sura.
23 Apart from the problem of Florus’ sources, it is important to stress here the number of
ideological themes that the author incorporates into his brief narration of the Syrian
War:  in  addition  to  the  parallelism  to  the  Greco-Persian  Wars,41 which  were  an
important part of the ideological discourse that Rome developed against Antiochus III
already at the time of the Syrian War, there are also precise references to the idea of
universal  dominion  and  its  expression  through  the  concept  of  translatio  imperii.42
Adding to the evidence mentioned above, Florus further confirms the primary role that
the themes of the translatio imperii and of the summa imperii played at the time of the
clash between Rome and the Hellenistic kingdoms.
24 In the context of the connection between the theme of the translatio imperii and the
Syrian War, a further aspect of Aemilius Sura’s excerpt is worth mentioning. In my
opinion, it is not accidental that Aemilius Sura insists on the Macedonian origins of
both Philip and Antiochus (Velleius Paterculus, 1.6.6): exinde duobus regibus Philippo et
Antiocho, qui a Macedonibus oriundi erant,  haud multo post Carthaginem subactam devictis
summa imperii ad populum Romanum pervenit. In order to justify the transfer of universal
dominion to Roman hands after the defeat of Antiochus III, Aemilius Sura emphasises
that the Seleucid king was also of Macedonian origin.43 Such a detail  is  particularly
important to the topos of the succession of empires as it justifies the transfer of the
empire  from  Macedonia  to  Rome.  It  also  clarifies  that  it  was  the  victory  over  the
Seleucid monarch –  and not  over Philip V –  which constituted the last  step in the
succession of empires. This would point to a propagandistic motive: to present Rome as
the heir of the universal empires of the past and, thus, the legitimate inheritor of the
right to rule over the entire world.
Rome as the last universal empire in the ideological discourse of the 2nd cen...
Reconsidering Roman power
7
25 In summary, in the light of the evidence referring to the period of the oversea wars, the
hypothesis that the picture of Rome’s dominion as a universal empire spread already at
the very beginning of  the 2nd century BCE,  as suggested by Polybius,  appears to be
further confirmed.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alonso-Núñez 1989 = J.M. Alonso-Núñez, Aemilius Sura, in Latomus, 48, 1989, p. 110-119.
Breglia Pulci Doria 1983 = L. Breglia Pulci Doria, Oracoli sibillini tra rituali e propaganda. Studi su
Flegonte di Tralles, Naples, 1983.
Brown 1964 = T.S. Brown, Polybius’ Account of Antiochos III, in Phoenix, 18, 1964, p. 124-136.
Brunt 1978 = P.A. Brunt, Laus imperii, in P.D.A. Garnsey, C.R. Whittaker (ed.), Imperialism in the
Ancient World, Cambridge, 1978, p. 159-191, 320-330.
Büdinger 1895 = M. Büdinger, Die Universalhistorie im Alterthum, Vienna, 1895.
Cassola 1952 = F. Cassola, I gruppi politici romani nel III secolo a. C., Trieste, 1952.
Cornell 2013 = T.J. Cornell et al., The Fragments of the Roman Historians, Oxford, 2013.
Fabbrini 1983 = F. Fabbrini, Translatio imperi. L’impero universale da Ciro ad Augusto, Rome, 1983.
Ferrary 1998 = J.-L. Ferrary, L’oikoumène, l’orient et l’occident d’Alexandre le grand à Auguste. Histoire
et historiographie, in A. Fraschetti, A. Giardina, E. Lo Cascio (ed.), Convegno per Santo Mazzarino
(Roma, 9-11 maggio 1991), Rome, 1998, p. 97-132.
Gabba 1975 = E. Gabba, P. Cornelio Scipione Africano e la leggenda, in Athenaeum, 53, 1975, p. 3-17.
Gauger 1980 = J.-D. Gauger, Phlegon von Tralles, mirab. III. Zu einem Dokument geistiges Widerstandes
gegen Rom, in Chiron, 10, 1980, p. 225-261.
Hölscher 1984 = T. Hölscher, Actium und Salamis, in Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts,
99, 1984, p. 187-214.
La Roche 1857 = P. La Roche, Charakeristik des Polybios, Leipzig, 1857.
Mariotta 2014 = G. Mariotta, Geografia e geopolitica nelle Storie Filippiche, in C. Bearzot, F. Landucci
(ed.), Studi sull’Epitome di Giustino I. Dagli Assiri a Filippo II di Macedonia, Milan, 2014, p. 45-56.
Martelli 1978 = F. Martelli, In margine ad un frammento di Antistene. FGrHist 257 F 36, in Rivista storica
dell’antichità, 8, 1978, p. 123-131.
Martelli 1982 = F. Martelli, Ancora in margine ad un frammento di Antistene, in Rivista storica
dell’antichità, 12, 1982, p. 252-257.
Martin 1993 = P.-M. Martin, De l’universel à l’éternel. La liste des hégémonies dans la préface des A.R, in 
Pallas, 39, 1993, p. 193-217.
Mastrocinque 1982 = A. Mastrocinque, Scipione Africano e la campagna in Siria, in M. Sordi (ed.), 
Politica e religione nel primo scontro tra Roma e l’Oriente, Milan, 1982 (Contributi dell’Istituto di Storia
Antica, 8), p. 101-122.
Rome as the last universal empire in the ideological discourse of the 2nd cen...
Reconsidering Roman power
8
Mastrocinque 1983 = A. Mastrocinque, Manipolazione della storia in età ellenistica. I Seleucidi e Roma,
Rome, 1983.
Mazza 1996 = M. Mazza, Roma e i quattro imperi. Temi della propaganda nella cultura ellenistico-
romana, in Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni, 20, 1996, p. 315-350.
Mendels 1981 = D. Mendels, The Five Empires: A Note on a Propagandistic Topos, in The American
Journal of Philology, 102, 1981, p. 330-337.
Momigliano 1980 = A. Momigliano, Daniele e la teoria greca della successione degli imperi, in Rendiconti
Accademia dei Lincei, 35, 1980, p. 157-162.
Momigliano 1982 = A. Momigliano, The Origins of Universal History, in Annali della Scuola Normale
Superiore di Pisa, 12, ser. 2, 1982, p. 533-560.
Oost 1954 = S.I. Oost, Roman Policy in Epirus and Acarnania in the Age of Roman Conquest of Greece,
Dallas, 1954.
Passerini 1933 = A. Passerini, Studi di storia ellenistico-romana. V. L’ultimo piano di Annibale e una
testimonianza di Ennio, in Athenaeum, 11, 1933, p. 10-28.
Paton 1976 = Polybius: The Histories, trans. W.R. Paton, IV, London, 1976.
Peter 1906 = H. Peter, Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae, Leipzig, 1906.
Pietilä-Castrén 1987 = L. Pietilä-Castrén, Magnificentia Publica: The Victory Monuments of the Roman
Generals in the Era of the Punic Wars, Helsinki, 1987.
Porqueddu 1982 = M. Porqueddu, La storia di Antistene di Rodi e la profezia antiromana, in M. Sordi
(ed.), Politica e religione nel primo scontro tra Roma e l’Oriente, Milan, 1982 (Contributi dell’Istituto di
Storia Antica, 8), p. 3-11.
Russo 2009 = F. Russo, Aspetti e temi della propaganda antiromana di Mitridate VI Eupatore, in Rivista di
cultura classica e medioevale, 51, 2009, p. 399-428.
Russo 2010 = F. Russo, Le Termopili come luogo ideologico nella propaganda romana, in Studi Classici e
Orientali, 56, 2010, p. 31-56.
Russo 2011 = F. Russo, Le statue di Alcibiade e Pitagora nel comitium, in Annali della Scuola Normale
Superiore di Pisa, 3, ser. 5, 2011, p. 105-134.
Russo 2013 = F. Russo, Echoes of the Persian Wars in Roman Propaganda, in The Ancient World, 44-2,
2013, p. 160-176.
Russo 2014a = F. Russo, The Function of the Trojan Myth in Early Roman Expansionism in Greece and
Asia Minor, in A. Coşkun, V. Cojocaru (ed.), Interconnectivity in the Mediterranean and Pontic World
during the Hellenistic and Roman Periods, Cluj, 2014, p. 581-604.
Russo 2014b = F. Russo, Il ricordo delle guerre persiane a Roma nello scontro con Filippo V e Antioco III, in
Latomus, 73, 2014, p. 303-337.
Spawforth 1994 = A. Spawforth, Symbol of Unity? The Persian Wars Tradition in the Roman Empire, in
S. Hornblower (ed.), Greek Historiography, Oxford, 1994, p. 233-247.
Swain 1940 = J.W. Swain, The Theory of the Four Monarchies, in Classical Philology, 35, 1940, p. 1-21.
Thiel 1946 = J.H. Thiel, Studies on the History of Roman Seapower in Republican Times, Oxford, 1946.
Trieber 1892 = C. Trieber, Die Idee der vier Weltreiche, in Hermes, 27, 1892, p. 321-342.
Walbank 1963 = F.W. Walbank, Polybius and Rome’s Eastern Policy, in Journal of Roman Studies, 53,
1963, p. 1-13.
Rome as the last universal empire in the ideological discourse of the 2nd cen...
Reconsidering Roman power
9
Zancan 1942 = P. Zancan, Floro e Livio, Padua, 1942.
Zevi 1997 = F. Zevi, Il tempio dei Lari Permarini, la Roma degli Emilii e il mondo greco, in Mitteilungen des
Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, 104, 1997, p. 81-115.
NOTES
1. "ἠξίου  γὰρ  μνημονεύοντας  τῶν  προγεγονότων  ἀγώνων  ἄνδρας  ἀγαθοὺς  γίνεσθαι,
σφῶν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἀξίους, καὶ λαμβάνειν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ὅτι κρατήσαντες μὲν τῶν
ἐχθρῶν  οὐ  μόνον  τῶν  ἐν  Λιβύῃ  πραγμάτων  ἔσονται  κύριοι  βεβαίως,  ἀλλὰ  καὶ  τῆς
ἄλλης  οἰκουμένης  τὴν  ἡγεμονίαν  καὶ  δυναστείαν  ἀδήριτον  αὑτοῖς  τε  καὶ  τῇ  πατρίδι
περιποιήσουσιν". Translation from Paton 1976, p. 487.
2. La Roche 1857, p. 67. See discussion of the issue in Walbank 1963.
3. According to Walbank 1963, p. 10, "the speeches he has recorded are an accurate
version, in substance, of what was actually said".
4. "οὔτε  γὰρ  δυνάμεις  πολεμικωτέρας  οὔθ᾽  ἡγεμόνας  ἐπιτυχεστέρους  τούτων  καὶ
μᾶλλον ἀθλητὰς γεγονότας τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔργων εὕροι τις ἂν ἑτέρους, οὐδὲ μὴν
ἆθλα μείζω τὴν τύχην ἐκτεθεικυῖαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις τῶν τότε προκειμένων. οὐ γὰρ
τῆς Λιβύης αὐτῆς οὐδὲ τῆς Εὐρώπης ἔμελλον κυριεύειν οἱ τῇ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες, ἀλλὰ
καὶ  τῶν  ἄλλων  μερῶν  τῆς  οἰκουμένης,  ὅσα  νῦν  πέπτωκεν  ὑπὸ  τὴν  ἱστορίαν.  ὃ  καὶ
συνέβη γενέσθαι μετ᾽ ὀλίγον".
5. On  this  problem  see  Russo  2013  and  Russo  2014b  with  further  bibliographical
indications.
6. The  prophecy,  considered  an  interesting  piece  of  the  Aetolian  and  Seleucid
propaganda against Rome, is reproduced in a passage written by Antisthenes of Rhodes,
quoted by Phlegon of  Tralles (Antisth.  ap.  Phlegon of  Tralles,  περὶ  θαυμασίον,  3.9  =
FGrHist 257,  F  36,  p. 1176),  and  is  usually  interpreted  as  an  expression  of  Rome’s
enemies’ desire for revenge in the aftermath of the battle of Thermopylae. According to
a certain Publius (namely, P. Scipio Africanus), a king, hailing from Asia, would bring a
series  of  disasters  to  Italy  and Rome;  moreover,  Athena,  furious  with Rome,  would
bring war to Italy and invasion by an Asian army. Modern scholars, on the basis of the
precise historical information interwoven into the prophecy, argue that the text should
be dated to the Syrian War and that it was codified in an Aetolian context at some point
between the battle of Thermopylae and the peace of Apamea. On the evidence supplied
by Phlegon of Tralles see Breglia Pulci Doria 1983, and, for a general summary of the
problem, see Porqueddu 1982.  For prophecy’s meaning in the context of the Syrian
War, see Gabba 1975. According to Martelli 1982, p. 251, Antisthenes’ evidence should
be considered Seleucid in origin and should be dated to the end of the Syrian War.
Gauger 1980, p. 225-261 attributes the text of the oracle not to Antisthenes of Rhodes
but to another Antisthenes, a peripatetic Athenian, dating it to the period of the first
Mithridatic Wars. For a recent discussion of this topic, see Russo 2014b. For the possible
Mithridatic use of the prophecy, see Russo 2009.
7. Considering the relationship between Polybius and the Scipiones, it is conceivable
that the former consulted sources belonging to a philo-Scipionic tradition which, in the
wake of the success of the universal dominion theme during the Syrian War, sought to
portray P. Scipio Africanus as the true founder of Rome’s universal empire by virtue of
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his success at the Battle of Zama. Be this as it may, it remains clear that the ideological
core of P. Scipio Africanus’ speech, with its references to Rome’s universal dominion,
must be placed in the context of the decades following the Battle of Zama.
8. Passerini 1933, p. 11-14.
9. Antiochus autem, si tam in agendo bello consiliis eius parere voluisset, quam in suscipiendo
instituerat, propius Tiberi quam Thermopylis de summa imperii dimicasset.
10. This is one of the features of Cornelius Nepos’ account which prompts Passerini to
consider it reliable because it accords entirely with other traditions.
11. Russo 2010.
12. Russo 2013; Russo 2014b.
13. Livy  (35.14.5)  also  reports  (with  a  degree  of  scepticism)  a  dialogue  between
Hannibal and P. Scipio Africanus, which would have taken place at the Seleucid court.
14. For the propagandistic role played by the Scipionic circle in the context of  the
Syrian War, see Gabba 1975 and Mastrocinque 1982, p. 120-121.
15. Epitome of Pompeius Trogus’ Philippic Histories 30.4.4: Quo prodigio territis omnibus
vates cecinere, oriens Romanorum imperium vetus Graecorum ac Macedonum voraturum.
16. On the theme of translatio imperii, see especially Momigliano 1980 and Momigliano
1982. For an overview of the issue, see Fabbrini 1983. On Aemilius Sura, see Alonso-
Núñez 1989. For the controversial dating of Sura, see Swain 1940, who argues for the
first half of the 3rd century.
17. According to Ferrary 1998, p. 119, "il n’est pas impossible que Cynoscéphales ait
suscité plusieurs oracles ex eventu; mais il est au moins aussi probable que Trogue ait
réinterprété un oracle traduisant le désarroi des Grecs devant la défaite d’une phalange
crue invincible en faisant une prophétie dominée par le thème, encore anachronique en
197, de la translatio imperii".
18. Pausanias, 7.8.9 and Appian, Macedonian Affairs, fr. 2.
19. Ferrary 1998, p. 120.
20. For  an  overview  of  the  propagandistic  discourse  which  attended  the  Roman
military activity in Asia Minor and Greece during Rome’s oversea wars, see Russo 2013;
Russo 2014b; Russo 2014a (see especially the references cited there).
21. Ferrary 1998, p. 114-117.
22. Assyrii principes omnium gentium rerum potiti  sunt, deinde Medi, postea Persae, deinde
Macedones; exinde duobus regibus Philippo et Antiocho, qui a Macedonibus oriundi erant, haud
multo  post  Carthaginem subactam devictis  summa imperii  ad  populum Romanum pervenit.
Inter hoc tempus et initium regis Nini Assyriorum, qui princeps rerum potitus est, intersunt anni
MDCCCCXCV. Peter 1906, p. 161; Cornell 2013, p. 137, 617-618, n.103, 1145. On Aemilius
Sura, see Alonso-Núñez 1989. For the chronological problem, see especially Swain 1940;
Mendels 1981 and Martin 1993. For an overview of the ideological issues implied by
Aemilius Sura’s excerpt, see Mazza 1996 and Mariotta 2014.
23. Mendels  1981;  Alonso-Núñez 1989;  Ferrary 1998,  p. 129-130;  Martin 1993;  Mazza
1996, p. 325-328. Recently, Zevi 1997 links a passage from Florus’ account of the Syrian
War with a  passage  from Aemilius  Sura’s  writings.  In  this  fragment,  Aemilius  Sura
alludes to the defeat of Philip V at Cynoscephalae in 197 BCE and that of Antiochus III in
Magnesia in 190 BCE. Both battles took place after the battle of Zama of 202 BCE. As
Aemilius Sura mentions neither the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War (171 BCE)
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with  the  consequent  fall  of  Perseus  at  Pydna  (168  BCE)  and  the  annexation  of
Macedonia,  nor the destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE,  it  has been argued that he
wrote his work between 189 and 171 BCE. Given that the most important military event
of those years was the defeat of Antiochus III, which also serves as the natural historical
backdrop to the theory of the succession of empires, it can reasonably be argued that
Aemilius Sura’s work should be linked to the positive outcome of the Syrian campaign
regardless of the years in which the author was active. Studies adopting this approach
include:  Trieber  1892,  p. 337-338;  Oost  1954,  p. 66-67,  128-130;  Büdinger  1825,
p. 321-338;  Cassola  1952,  p. 65-66;  Brunt  1978,  p. 159-191,  320-330,  especially  p. 323;
Mastrocinque 1983, p. 151; Russo 2011.
24. See, for instance, Mendels 1981, p. 335 and Ferrary 1998, p. 130.
25. Brown 1964, p. 130, argues that the historian took his universal perspective of the
Roman empire from an original Roman tradition. This would be confirmed by the fact
that the theme also appears in a speech delivered by Tiberius Gracchus in Appian’s The
Civil Wars 1.11. Brown also claims that the fact that the supposed universal dominion of
Rome was actually only "partial" (if  measured against the later development of the
Roman Empire) indicates that this perspective must belong to the same chronological
period as Polybius and his account, i.e. the first half of the 2nd century. 
26. Mendels 1981, p. 337.
27. On the Mithridatic campaign, see Russo 2009. For the Augustan era and the Salamis-
Actium parallel see Hölscher 1984 and Spawforth 1994.
28. Antiocho terra marique superato et prope extra orbem terrae ultra iuga Tauri exacto. See
Mastrocinque 1982, p. 121.
29. Non aliud formidolosius fama bellum fuit;  quippe cum Persas et orientem, Xerxen atque
Darium cogitarent, quando perfossi invii montes, quando velis opertum mare nuntiaretur.
30. Tum praecipitem apud Thermopylas adsecutus, locum trecentorum Laconum speciosa caede
memorandum, ne ibi quidem fiducia loci resistentem mari ac terra cedere coegit.
31. Ne sibi placeant Athenae: in Antiocho vicimus Xerxen, in Aemilio Alcibiadem aequavimus,
Epheso Salamina pensavimus.
32. Russo 2011.
33. In his account of the campaign against Antiochus III,  Livy makes only two brief
references to the Thermopylae episode (36.15.12; 16.6-7).
34. On  the  relationship  between  the  Florus  and  Livy  traditions,  see  Zancan  1942,
p. 35-68 which is still relevant today. Through a detailed analysis of parallel sections of
Livy and Florus, Zancan demonstrates the latter’s independence from the former.
35. For the possible connection between Aemilius Sura and the Aemilii, see Russo 2011.
36. For  the  significance  of  the  inscription  as  a  historic  document  relating  to  the
ideological climate of the Syrian War, see Zevi 1997, p. 85. The scholars interpret L.
Aemilius Regillus’ tabula as an extremely valuable text because it is, without a doubt,
contemporary to the events and free from later revisions. The temple of Lares Permarini
was dedicated in 190 BCE by L.  Aemilius Regillus as praetor  navalis.  The temple was
completed and dedicated by Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, who was censor in 179 BCE (Livy
40.52.4):  Idem (Lepidus)  dedicavit  aedem Larum Permarinum in campo.  Voverat  eam annis
undecim ante L. Aemilius Regillus navali proelio adversus praefectos regis Antiochi. See also
Macrobius, Saturnalia 1.10.10: Undecimo autem Kalendas (Ianuarias, scil.) feriae sunt Laribus
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dedicatae, quibus aedem bello Antiochi Aemilius Regillus praetor in Campo Martio curandam
vovit.  The  name Permarini is  absent  in  Macrobius  but  used in  Livy  and in  the  Fasti
Praenestini. See also Pietilä-Castrén 1987, p. 91-94.
37. Duello magno dirimendo, regibus subigendis, caput patrandae pacis hac pugna exeunti L.
Aemilio M. filio […] auspicio imperio felicitate ductuque eius inter Ephesum Samum Chiumque,
inspectante eopse Antiocho, exercitu omni, equitatu elephantisque, classi regis Antiochi ante hac
invicta  fusa  contusa  fugataque  est,  ibique  eo  die  naves  longae  cum  omnibus  sociis  captae
quadraginta duae […] Ea pugna pugnata rex Antiochos regnumque […] Eius rei  ergo aedem
Laribus Permarinis vovit.
38. Livy, 37.30.7-8; Appian, The Syrian Wars, 5.27. Cf. Thiel 1946, p. 356 n.624.
39. Zevi 1997, p. 101.
40. Zevi 1997, p. 85, stresses the convergence between Florus’ passage and L. Aemilius
Regillus’  dedicatory  inscription.  However,  Zancan 1942,  p. 5  argues  that  one  of  the
more important characteristics of Florus’ historical vision is precisely his belief in the
inevitability of Roman imperial expansion (as appears in his introduction to The Syrian
War).
41. For this aspect of Florus’ passage, see especially Russo 2013 and Russo 2014b.
42. Florus (1.24.1-18) also articulates another fundamental concept: the expansion of
the Roman empire to the East, as an inevitable and indeed necessary event (1.24.1):
Macedoniam  statim  Asia  et  regem  Philippum  Antiochos  excepit  quondam  casu,  quasi  de
industria sic adgubernante fortuna, ut quem ad modum ab Africa in Europam, sic ab Europa in
Asiam ultro se suggerentibus causis imperium procederet, et cum terrarum orbis situ ipse ordo
victoriarum navigaret.  The beginning of  the "most  terrible" battles  of  all  is  not  only
described in the adulatory and rhetorical terms that characterise the whole chapter,
but also serves to introduce the theme of the development of the Roman Empire from
Africa to Asia, sic adgubernante fortuna.
43. According  to  Mendels  1981,  p. 331,  Aemilius Sura’s  enumeration  of  empires  is
chronologically speaking, insignificant. Mendels’ comparison to a passage from Sallust
(Historiae 1.55.4) is,  however, misleading as the latter is certainly an incomplete list
composed  for  illustrative  purposes  only.  Sura’s  intention,  by  contrast,  is  clearly  to
stress  that  the  end  of  the  Macedonian  Empire  –  that  is,  after  the  victory  over
Antiochus III – marked the beginning of Rome taking the reins of the universal empire.
Cf. Ferrary 1998, p. 129.
ABSTRACTS
Beginning with a reassessment of passages from Polybius and other 2nd-century BCE sources, this
study aims to show that the concept of a universal empire was an important issue in Roman,
philo-Roman, and anti-Roman propagandistic discourse during Rome’s oversea wars. In addition,
it will show that the incorporation of Rome into the scheme of translatio imperii (the succession of
universal  empires)  belongs  to  this  same  ideological  environment.  This  is  in  contrast  to  the
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prevailing view in scholarship which argues that this theme was only codified later, in a late-
republican or even early-imperial tradition.
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Keywords: Polybius, Florus, Aemilius Sura, Velleius Paterculus, summa imperii, translatio
imperii, universal empire, Macedonian Wars, Syrian War, Philip V, Antiochus III
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